Working Papers and Peer-reviewed Publications (available upon request)  

Illiberal Human Rights Norms in Trade and the Effectiveness of Western Conditionalities (Job Market Paper, Dissertation Chapter II)

Under Review

 Can international organizations effectively promote liberal norms amid the proliferation of competing illiberal norms and organizations? The European Union (EU) is a leading organization that promotes human rights norms abroad, particularly through conditionalities in preferential trade agreements, as the largest trading bloc in the world. Analyzing all EU trading partners' pre- and post-treaty conclusion processes between 1991 and 2019, I argue that resistance to EU norms is significantly more likely among states that are deeply embedded in overlapping regional trade agreements (RTAs) composed predominantly of human rights-violating members. These RTAs reinforce countervailing illiberal human rights institutions—authoritarian laws and norms that emphasize relativist approaches to human rights and sovereignty—loosely tied to economic integration as non-conditionalities. This nexus of trade and illiberal human rights norms undermines Western trade–human rights linkages as mirror images, lowering the cost of noncompliance by providing attractive economic alternatives and collective bargaining power, while also reducing domestic and international reputational costs through the institutionalization of illiberal norms. My findings indicate that high levels of embeddedness reduce the effectiveness of EU human rights conditionalities and increase the likelihood of trade negotiation failures. However, this embeddedness does not negate their effectiveness during negotiations, and EU agreements improve human rights outcomes in countries with low embeddedness. This suggests that the EU’s normative leverage through trade agreements is short-lived and moderate—but nonetheless real. This study sheds light on the current status of the changing liberal international order and offers new insights into the effectiveness of trade–human rights linkages.


Linking Human Rights to Trade: Institutional Politics and Disguised Protectionism of the EU  (Dissertation Chapter I)

Under Review

The European Union is the most active trading entity in the world that includes human rights clauses (HRCs) into almost all its trade agreements.  However, HRCs vary substantially across agreements, which I demonstrate using novel data.  I argue that the stringency of human rights clauses-as well as the selection of countries into EU trade agreements--is conditioned by institutional politics between the legislative and the executive bodies of the EU. Specifically, when the European Parliament (EP) has more bargaining leverage relative to the European Commission, human rights will be a more prominent component of EU foreign policy, reflecting public interests in the European electorate.  I find that when the EP has strong protectionist incentives and institutional bargaining power-a decline in public trust in the Commission-- the EU becomes less likely to conclude trade agreements with human rights violators, and more likely to insert stringent HRCs in the agreements. I also find that these effects are magnified after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which institutionally empowered the EP. I find little evidence of human rights conditions in partner countries affecting HRCs. The implication is that institutional politics within the EU are at least as important as actual human rights conditions in shaping the substance of EU trade agreements, as well as negotiations.


Regionalism as Rhetoric: How Non-Democracies Invoke International Organizations at the UN 

Revise and Resubmit at International Interactions

The United Nations General Debate offers a unique platform for states to articulate their foreign policy priorities and frame their commitments to international norms. While the UN promotes universal values and multilateral cooperation, other international organizations beyond the UN are frequently referenced in the debate. This paper examines how non-democracies, as well as states experiencing democratic and human rights erosion, strategically reference regional organizations in the context of discussing regional solidarity and liberal international norms such as human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. I argue that non-democracies use this rhetoric to shield themselves from Western pressure and present an appearance of compliance with liberal norms while simultaneously emphasizing sovereignty, self-determination, and regional approaches to domestic issues. By framing these matters as regional concerns, these states strategically seek to undermine the universality of liberal norms and broader enforcement at the multilateral level. Drawing on AI-assisted text analysis of a readily available corpus, the study finds that autocracies and hybrid regimes are more likely to reference regional and illiberal international organizations (relative to the total number of IO references) and invoke liberal international norms when discussing these organizations. Democracies, however, do not necessarily reference more international organizations. These findings shed light on the rhetorical strategies of backsliding states and contribute to our understanding of how international norms are referenced and contested by regional actors in a multilateral context.



The Effectiveness of Trade Adjustment Assistance Programs on Political Trust in the US and EU (with Rachel Yu and Soeren Etzerodt) 


Political trust is a key determinant of policy preferences and long-term policy outcomes. While trade adjustment assistance programs aim to mitigate the negative impacts of globalization, most research evaluates their effectiveness through electoral outcomes and public support for free trade. However, these programs may also have broader effects on political trust and long-term policy decisions, a relationship that remains understudied. This paper examines political trust as an alternative measure of trade adjustment program effectiveness, comparing the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF). We argue that the EGF is more effective due to (1) its insulation from political and partisan influence in fund distribution and (2) its emphasis on education and training over direct cash transfers, as seen in the TAA. Using geo-located survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and Eurobarometer, we assess how these institutional differences influence political trust. Addressing causality, we leverage a staggered difference-in-differences design with new panel data at the municipality level from Denmark. We find that trade adjustment assistance is increasing preferences for the EU in the short to medium term. Our findings suggest that political trust can serve as an alternative measure of trade policy effectiveness.


Linking the Death Penalty to Trade: Bureaucratic Politics among European Institutions (2018) East and West Studies 30(3), 67-99 with Min Gyo Koo.